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ABSTRACT 
Over the course of India’s six decades of statehood, the central government 
granted and removed authority to and from states resulting in a variety of development 
patterns among Indian states and across different periods of India’s history.  The cases 
presented here illustrate that when sub-national groups with well-entrenched and capable 
governing institutions successfully lobbied the center for more authority, several 
developmental outcomes – reducing insurgent violence, promoting economic growth, and 
reducing poverty – of the groups strengthened.  When the central government failed to 
relinquish power and responsibility to such states, development slowed or stalled.  
Conversely, development did not significantly improve in states with weak governing 
institutions even when they requested and were granted more power from the center 
illustrating the importance of embedded and strong state institutions in state development.  
This thesis examines the effect of decentralization on three aspects of 
development and describes the conditions under which decentralization and centralization 
promote or impede insurgency, economic growth, and poverty reduction.  Based on 
empirical data from Indian states and detailed analysis of India’s shifting political 
economy over time, it is shown that the decentralization of fiscal and political authority 
to capable sub-national governments enhances development programs.  Conversely, 
centralizing authority in the presence of a capable sub-national government, or ceding 
authority to incapable sub-national governments impedes development. 
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I. DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
A. DECENTRALIZATION BASICS 
1. Thesis 
Over the course of India’s six decades of statehood, the central government 
granted and removed authority to and from states resulting in a variety of development 
patterns among Indian states and across different periods of India’s history.  The cases 
presented here will illustrate that when sub-national groups with well-embedded and 
capable governing institutions successfully lobbied the center for more authority, many 
developmental outcomes the group sought strengthened.  In the cases where the central 
government did not relinquish power and responsibility to states with strong government 
institutions, development slowed or stalled.  Conversely, development was not 
significantly improved in areas or states with weak governing institutions even when they 
requested and were granted more power from the center. 
This thesis examines the effect of decentralization on three aspects of 
development – insurgency, economic growth, and poverty reduction – and describes the 
conditions under which decentralization and centralization promotes or impedes those 
characteristics.  Based on empirical data from Indian states and detailed analysis of 
India’s shifting political economy over time, it is shown that the decentralization of fiscal 
and political authority to capable sub-national governments promotes development.  
Conversely, centralizing authority in the presence of a capable sub-national government, 
or ceding authority to incapable sub-national governments impedes development. 
2. Background 
Significant events such as the rapid development of Asian countries in the 1980s 
and 1990s and the fall of the Soviet Union instigated a wave of deliberation among 
scholars and policy makers throughout the world. Government leaders, politicians, and 
citizens alike have been increasingly engaging in conversations regarding the most 
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effective means of promoting good governance, economic growth, and the relationship 
between the two.  Countries on all continents are making serious shifts in the authority 
central governments wield in comparison to their sub-national governments.  The debate 
on decentralization aspects of Iraq’s fledgling democracy illustrates the importance of 
this subject.1  In relation to developing democracies, questions regarding how much fiscal 
and political decentralization, if any, are beneficial to development – particularly in the 
areas of violence reduction, economic growth, and poverty reduction – are critical parts 
of this discussion. 
In this thesis, I examine the conditions and linkages between decentralization and 
development by analyzing the varying degrees of development in selected Indian states 
and in India as a whole over different periods.  Since independence in 1947, the central 
government enacted different decentralization policies and mechanisms over time and for 
different regions.  Subsequently, groups of Indian states exhibit a variety of development 
patterns over the past several decades in the areas of insurgency-related violence, 
economic growth, and poverty reduction.  Understanding that decentralization is not a 
sole responsible factor for such deviations, this thesis investigates the conditions 
surrounding decentralization policies that produce positive and negative development 
trends.  It also argues that the capability of sub-national governments is a key factor by 
comparing historical decentralization policies with regional and periodic patterns of 
insurgency, economic growth, and poverty. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although the amount of literature on decentralization has increased greatly over 
the past two decades, the debates have remained quite linear.  Writings on political 
decentralization focus on the degree local participation plays in effective governance.  
Fiscal decentralization literature primarily examines local or national economic 
                                                 
1 Ivan Eland, “The Way Out of Iraq: Decentralizing the Iraqi Government,” International Journal on 
World Peace 22, no. 1 (2005): 39-81; Robert M McNab and Edward Mason, “Reconstruction, the Long 
Tail and Decentralisation: An Application to Iraq and Afghanistan,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 18, no. 3 
(2007): 363. 
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outcomes.2  Few existing studies connect decentralization and insurgent violence, 
arguably another viable indication of a society’s development.  This thesis aims to make 
a contribution to this research and advance our understanding of the relationship between 
decentralization and development. 
1. Decentralization and Insurgency 
The ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought insurgency and 
counter-insurgency debates back to the fore.  Although some of this literature addresses 
the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery and economic growth as attenuators to 
insurgent activity, literature specifically exploring the relationship between 
decentralization (political and fiscal) and insurgency is rare.  This thesis attempts to fill 
this gap by providing an introductory tour of the subject and then suggesting paths for 
future research. 
McNab and Mason address the decentralization-insurgency relationship through 
an examination of the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  They argue that the 
decentralization of reconstruction authority from upper echelon military commanders to 
company commanders in the field will more adequately meet the service requests of local 
societies, strengthen local governing institutions, and perhaps spur local economic growth 
and investment.3  Their theory of reconstruction is akin to political decentralization in 
more common debates: the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq is virtually synonymous 
with a central government, and company commanders act like regional and local 
authorities.  Military units can initiate projects at the local level which deliver services 
that have been requested by citizens such as roads, wells, and sanitation services.4  
                                                 
2 For example, see Lucas I González, “Political Power, Fiscal Crises, and Decentralization in Latin 
America: Federal Countries in Comparative Perspective,” Publius 38, no. 2 (2008): 211-247; Martin 
Painter, “From Command Economy to Hollow State? Decentralisation in Vietnam and China,” Australian 
Journal of Public Administration 67, no. 1 (2008): 79-88; Baoyun Qiao,  Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and 
Yongsheng Xu, “The Tradeoff Between Growth and Equity in Decentralization Policy: China's 
Experience,” Journal of Development Economics 86, no. 1 (2008): 112-128; and Joseph Lluís Carrion-i-
Silvestre,  Marta Espasa,  and Toni Mora, “Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in Spain,” Public 
Finance Review 36, no. 2 (2008): 194-213. 
3 McNab, 363. 
4 Ibid., 366. 
 4
McNab and Mason argue that because deployed military units are more able to discern 
the specific needs of individual neighborhoods than a central command authority, a high 
degree of decentralization in project targeting decisions more effectively assuages civil 
unrest that foments insurgency.5 
However, using those similarities to build a theory governing political or fiscal 
decentralization and insurgency would be highly speculative.  The insurgency in Iraq and 
Afghanistan occurred in the wake of a total dismantlement of the central government and 
in the presence of a foreign occupation force.  These issues potentially usher in factors 
which cloud the theory of decentralization and development in a more stable national 
setting.  There are differences between the insurgencies described above and grassroots 
insurgencies within countries that have capable, well-entrenched central governments.  In 
this regard, traditional research on the causes of insurgency offers some direction in 
determining the effect decentralization has on insurgent movements. 
Galula’s studies on insurgency are still often cited despite having been written 
almost 50 years ago.  This suggests that his theories on insurgencies are sound and can be 
applied to the insurgent activity within India.  One argument he makes regarding 
insurgent leaders is that they must have made a claim or formulated an ideology which 
will be supported by the majority of the population amongst whom the insurgency will be 
fought.6  Furthermore, those ideologies may either be secessionist or revolutionary.  In 
either case, the activities of the insurgency are directed against the central government 
under whose control the perceived inequalities are not addressed.  Both of these 
observations apply to the insurgencies in Punjab and Northeast India that are examined in 
this thesis. 
Other authors tie together economic and political reasons for insurgency arguing 
that economic grievances far outweigh political reasons when seeking real reasons for 
                                                 
5 McNab, 375. 
6 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 1964), 8. 
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insurgencies, even though social or ethnic differences are the issues most highly touted.7  
Collier and Hoeffler empirically illustrate that reliance upon primary commodities in the 
presence of unequal, multi-ethnic societies is highly co-relational to states, which 
experienced civil wars from 1960 to 1999, more so than inequality, lack of political 
rights, or religious differences.8 This is important for research here because it suggests 
that research into the decentralization-insurgency relationship should focus on fiscal 
decentralization.  Perhaps more centralization of fiscal authority could ensure equal 
redistribution amidst a dependence on rents from primary commodities.  Greater 
decentralization of fiscal authority could more efficiently support local infrastructure or 
produce horizontal imbalances amongst sub-national governments.  It is a contention of 
this thesis that studies of the decentralization-insurgency relationship should not focus on 
fiscal decentralization alone but should include the aspect of political decentralization as 
well.  The cases in this thesis demonstrate that political decentralization without fiscal 
decentralization does not always alleviate insurgent activities. 
A study of USSR’s spin-off republics supports this claim.  According to research 
conducted on insurgencies in post-Soviet Union states, ethnic violence was avoided in the 
Republic of Buryatia through political decentralization within a framework of democratic 
institutions which guaranteed ethnic freedoms and equal access to all economic 
institutions in the republic.9  Although former Soviet states dealing with ethnic-related 
insurgencies get far more attention, Buryatia deserves some attention for the lack of 
insurgency.  Yet, they contend that it is the consociational democracy, the “privatization 
of ethnicity,” and the inclusion of all ethnic groups in governmental seats of authority 
which has mitigated insurgent violence in that state.10  This was accomplished through 
constitutionally guaranteed rights for ethnic minorities.11  The Buryatia case emphasizes 
                                                 
7 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, 
no. 4 (2004): 563. 
8 Collier and Hoeffler, 563. 
9 Olaf Leisse and Utta-Kristin Leisse, “A Siberian Challenge: Dealing with Multiethnicity in the 
Republic of Buryatia,” Nationalities Papers 35, no. 4 (2007): 773-788. 
10 Ibid., 784. 
11 Ibid., 779. 
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the importance of political decentralization as an undermining factor in insurgency, even 
if economic issues are the primary cause of most insurgent uprisings.  The conditions 
surrounding the insurgency cases in India discussed here will further contribute to our 
understanding of the decentralization-insurgency relationship. 
2. Decentralization and Economic Growth 
Theories on optimizing economic growth abound.  Literature on decentralization 
and economic growth understandably focuses primarily on fiscal decentralization; while 
political decentralization is either assumed to be linked to fiscal decentralization or is 
rarely addressed in economic development literature.  General consensus is that fiscal 
decentralization promotes economic growth.  However, this thesis raises questions 
regarding that generality. 
As sub-national regions gain more political and fiscal authority, they can tailor 
laws, tax codes, and other economic incentives to maximize the production strengths of 
the region in accordance with the desires of the cultures contained therein as well as 
reinvest revenue into production infrastructure.12  However, this assumption does not 
take into account the differences between political decentralization and fiscal 
decentralization, the subdivision of fiscal authority into revenue generation and 
expenditure authority, or the capability of the sub-national government to correctly shape 
complimentary fiscal and political policies.  A deeper analysis of the decentralization-
growth relationship yields results that are not at all linear, as the uneven growth rates of 
India’s states illustrates. 
Central government’s fiscal authority itself has two sides: the ability to collect 
revenue and the ability to distribute it.  Central governments may, for example, allow a 
state government to enact its own tax structure and establish its own permit and licensing 
fees but still mandate how those funds will be spent, regardless of local preferences.  
Conversely, a state may not have any revenue source but may spend the grant from the 
                                                 
12 Baoyun Qiao, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Yongsheng Xu, “The Tradeoff Between Growth and Equity 
in Decentralization Policy: China's Experience,” Journal of Development Economics 86, no. 1 (April 1, 
2008): 125. 
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central government any way it chooses.  In either of the above examples, the center still 
retains dominant control.  Even if the center grants sub-national governments total 
control over how a central grant is to be spent, the sub-national government is not entirely 
free to decide since they are dependent on the benevolence of the center for future grants.  
The question remains of whether fiscal decentralization causes growth or growth 
allows fiscal decentralization.  Also, what are the optimum degrees of fiscal 
decentralization along a country’s development timeline?  Oates describes a high degree 
of correlation between developed countries and decentralized fiscal systems.13  However, 
he rightfully acknowledges that that claim is based on a static environment, and the 
degree of centralization can change in both directions over time.  For example, the 
percentage of U.S. central government’s spending went from 1/3 to 2/3 that of the state 
governments from 1900 to the 1950s – a centralizing trend – but has since receded.14 
Furthermore he states that sub-national governments must have the capacity to make 
responsible fiscal decisions for fiscal decentralization to promote economic growth, a 
significant observation for former colonies, many of which inherited a highly centralized 
fiscal system with underdeveloped local institutions.15 
The relationship between revenue collection authority and expenditure authority 
is another very important aspect of fiscal decentralization.16  As noted previously, ceding 
authority of one without the other may not at all achieve any of the positive effects 
desired by such initiatives, such as efficient and effective services delivery.  George 
Guess notes that an imbalance of fiscal authority and responsibility may actually create 
enough social and political tension to cause societies to roll back decentralization 
efforts.17  The cases studied in this thesis confirm this observation, as India has at times 
rescinded decentralization policies in the face of national pressures. 
                                                 
13 Wallace E Oates, “Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Development,” National Tax Journal 
(1986-1998) 46, no. 2 (1993): 237-242. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 George M. Guess, “Adjusting Fiscal Decentralization Programs to Improve Service Results in 
Bulgaria and Romania,” Public Administration Review 67, no. 4 (July 1, 2007): 733. 
17 Ibid., 731-744. 
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A study of Chinese fiscal decentralization shows that political decentralization 
and economic growth are linked.  When some sub-national governments were granted 
authority to keep some of the revenue generated locally, growth-enhancing behavior was 
observed: inefficient practices were eliminated, capital was reinvested into infrastructure, 
and industries streamlined themselves in order to compete with regional neighbors.  
However, because of intra-regional trade barriers and other political obstacles, actual 
economic growth was muted.18  This example suggests that fiscal and political 
decentralization policies implemented simultaneously might enable faster economic 
growth if properly coordinated.   
The notion that decentralization equals faster economic growth is not the correct 
message of the above illustration: A recent empirical study of fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth in Spain suggests that the relationship is not linear but conditional.19  
Fiscal decentralization down to sub-national levels only succeeded in improving 
economic growth when sub-national regions already had capable fiscal institutional 
capacities; and economic growth was stunted in the presence of incapable sub-national 
fiscal institutions.  Research also empirically relates strong economic growth with fiscal 
decentralization in the presence of strong national political parties.20 
3. Decentralization and Poverty Reduction 
Poverty reduction efforts are a heavily researched subject, though connections 
between decentralization and poverty alleviation are weak.21  Arguments which try to 
connect decentralization of any type with poverty need to be examined closely as 
decentralization initiatives often fail to reach down to the level of those living in poverty.  
Furthermore, it must be remembered that most empirical research on poverty reduction 
                                                 
18 Elliott Parker and Judith Thornton, “Fiscal Centralisation and Decentralisation in Russia and 
China,” Comparative Economic Studies 49, no. 4 (2007): 514-542. 
19 Joseph Lluís Carrion-i-Silvestre, Marta Espasa, and Toni Mora, “Fiscal Decentralization and 
Economic Growth in Spain,” Public Finance Review 36, no. 2 (2008): 194. 
20 Ruben Enikolopov and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Decentralization and Political Institutions,” 
Journal of Public Economics 91, no. 11 (2007): 2261-2290. 
21 Craig Johnson, Priya Deshingkar, and Daniel Start, “Grounding the State: Devolution and 
Development in India’s Panchayats,” The Journal of Development Studies 41, no. 6 (August 2005): 938. 
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has been done in areas with high levels of poverty as opposed to regions which have 
already reduced poverty to a very small amount.  These studied regions often lack central 
and local capacities that more developed regions have; so decentralization in and of itself 
carries with it different implications.  Just because a developed country with low levels of 
poverty has highly decentralized anti-poverty mechanisms does not mean less developed 
countries need to decentralize their poverty alleviation initiatives as much as possible. 
That being said, several studies focus on poverty reduction through centralizing or 
decentralizing policies in a variety of environments.22  Combined with an analysis of 
poverty reduction in India presented here, this literature offers significant insight into the 
role of decentralization in poverty reduction.  For instance, researchers have found that 
political and fiscal decentralization efforts in parts of Africa actually inhibited poverty 
reduction.23  Uganda and Malawi, in an effort to specifically reduce rural poverty levels, 
granted greater fiscal authority to local governments.  As the size of grants from the 
center to the sub-national governments decreased, local governments began raising tax 
rates and instituting more permit and licensing requirements and fees which, in effect, 
created more barriers to those citizens trying to claw their way out of poverty.  Similarly, 
in Zimbabwe, rural local governments were strained when the central government ceded 
revenue and expenditure authority to them.  In addition to the small tax base, larger 
government institutions had to be created to perform some of the functions the central 
government had overseen, disproportionately expanding local expenditures.24  These and 
the cases examined in this thesis support the conclusion that decentralization does not 
automatically lead to poverty reduction. 
Never far from any debates over decentralization is the issue of corruption.  
Oates’ observations about corruption and decentralization as applied to economic growth 
also holds true in poverty studies: although corruption is found more at the local levels, it 
has a diminishing effect on economic growth whether it is at the center or the local 
                                                 
22 Frank Ellis, Milton Kutengule, and Alfred Nyasulu, “Livelihoods and Rural Poverty Reduction in 
Malawi,” World Development 31, no. 9 (2003): 1495-1510; Diana Conyers, “Decentralisation in 
Zimbabwe: A Local Perspective,” Public Administration & Development 23, no. 1 (2003): 115-124. 
23 Ibid., 1495-1510. 
24 Conyers, 121. 
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levels.25  Similar conclusions regarding poverty reduction can be reached in Africa.  Lack 
of commitment by local authorities to poverty reduction is just as detrimental to pro-poor 
policies as when central authorities lack commitment as well.  Crook concludes that pro-
poor outcomes under decentralization policies are usually ineffective without strong anti-
poverty sentiments in both the center and state levels and bolstered by centrally-managed 
agrarian reforms, since most poor are rural.26 
Bird and Rodriguez would concur with Crook’s findings, but would qualify the 
agrarian reforms as a need specific to the region in question.  In their empirical study of 
South American, African, and Southeast Asian countries, they found that while there was 
some connection between social expenditures, social services provided, and poverty 
reduction, the features which made some countries more successful than others in 
actually reducing poverty were particular initiatives which targeted the specific needs of 
the poverty-stricken in the region.27  They conclude that decentralization is the most 
efficient means of effectively targeting poverty alleviation initiatives, although their 
empirical data does not support the idea that decentralization benefits the state as a 
whole. 
In summary, most of the poverty literature does not distinguish between political 
decentralization and fiscal decentralization, either assuming one comes with the other or 
addressing only fiscal decentralization, since poverty reduction is usually strongly 
associated with economic performance.  The above discussion, and much of the literature 
on decentralization as outlined below, can be summarized by the following points: 
• Effectiveness versus efficiency.  Highly centralized governments may 
deliver services more efficiently to citizens due to economy of scale; but 
because the services are not tailored to specific local preferences, the 
services are not as effective.  Decentralized governments can identify 
                                                 
25 Oates, 237-242. 
26 Richard C. Crook., “Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Politics of Local-
Central Relations,” Public Administration & Development 23, no. 1 (2003): 77. 
27 Richard Bird and Edgard R. Rodriguez, “Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation: International 
Experience and the Case of the Philippines,” Public Administration & Development 19, no. 3 (1999): 299. 
 11
specific needs of its citizens, but either lack the capital to satisfy those 
needs or they satisfy those needs inefficiently. 
• Equality versus growth.  Centralized governments can more effectively 
redistribute revenue; but redirecting revenue attained from more profitable 
entities to less profitable ones inhibits growth.  Decentralized governments 
may result in a variety of sub-national growth rates, thereby resulting in 
intrastate competition and unequal growth, though aggregate growth is 
strengthened. 
• Stability versus instability.  Central governments wielding much political 
and fiscal authority have more resources with which to physically and 
socially control the movements and behavior of its citizens.  Decentralized 
governments are subject to greater regional variances amongst its states. 
Central governments must consider this research when designing decentralizing 
policies with an eye toward improving development.  The variety of outcomes from 
India’s policies will show that there are conditions under which decentralization 
improves or impedes aspects of development. 
C. INDIA AS A CASE STUDY OF DECENTRALIZATION 
India is a good case study for decentralization and its effect on development.  It 
has embarked on both fiscal and political decentralization efforts to differing degrees 
amongst its states over a period of time.  Also, states have experienced different rates of 
development.  An examination of the reasons for such a disparity under the same 
overarching central government will provide a better understanding of the relationship 
between development and decentralization. 
After the turbulence of partition, pockets of secessionist movements developed in 
various Indian states, and some remain active.  The northeastern states are notorious 
hotbeds of insurgent activity.  Punjab was quite active in the 80s, and relatively new 
strains of Islamist movements have sprouted in the late 90s.  The state government 
handled these secessionist and revolutionary insurgent movements with different political 
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and economic strategies.  Military and paramilitary assistance from the center has also 
played an important role in the suppression of these insurgencies.  One focus of this 
thesis is on the connection between political and fiscal decentralization policies and the 
development of insurgences in selected states. 
 
Figure 1.   Net State Domestic Product Per Capita.28 
                                                 
28 Government of India, Economic Survey of India 2007-2008 (New Delhi: Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance, 2008), A-4. 
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Figure 2.   Annual Growth Rate of India, 1951-2007.29 
The Indian cases illustrate that the central government overtly retained more fiscal 
and political authority over some state governments than others at various times.  
Potentially, one of the most obvious developmental outcomes of these policies is the 
uneven economic growth rate of the states (Figure 1) as well as the uneven aggregate 
growth over the decades (Figure 2). 
The inward-looking socialist policies which emerged out of the democratic 
environment of a developing country mandated that the central government maintain 
tight control of the purse strings.  During this time, the various political communities 
faced balancing popular demand for redistribution with a struggling economy. While the 
economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s put the country on an upward trend, some 
states have not shown significant improvement in their growth rate, and some have even 
had periods of negative growth.  Taking into account inherent natural wealth promoters 
such as abundance of natural resources, proximity to deep-water ports or trade centers, 
arable land, this thesis look at the role played by both fiscal and political decentralization 
in promoting or hindering growth in selected Indian states. 
Poverty reduction has always been a high profile item on India’s domestic 
agenda, sometimes considered to be a top priority by some of the nation’s public  
politicians.  While the overall UN-defined poverty rate of India has continued decrease 
                                                 
29 Government of India, Economic Survey of India 2007-2008 (New Delhi: Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance, 2008), A-4. 
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over the past quarter century, the 25% poverty rate is still appallingly high; and the 
disparity between states, in some cases such as Jammu & Kashmir and Goa at less than 
5% and Orissa at almost 50%, suggests that there may be a correlation with uneven 
central government policies (Figure 3).  Furthermore, poverty in the country has both 
fallen and risen over time, not necessarily connected to the priority given to anti-poverty 
policies, highlighting again the importance of state policy implementation.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Poverty Rate of Select Indian States.30 
                                                 
30 Government of India, Economic Survey of Delhi 2005-2006, (New Delhi: Government of India, 
Ministry of Finance, 2006), 379, Table 21.1. 
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In framing the constitution during the early years of independence, India was 
faced with two main issues: 1) a multitude of cultures expecting representation and 
services and 2) an uneven dispersal of natural resources.31  The resulting document ceded 
some autonomy to the states so as to better address individual cultural groups but kept the 
majority of fiscal authority in the center, so as to evenly spread the revenues from the 
asperous array of natural endowments.  Barring other inputs, this theory suggests that 
decentralization in India, particularly of fiscal authority, will spell disaster for sub-
national governments not inherently wealthy due to location and the lack of valuable raw 
materials within its borders.   Although inter-state growth inequities have increased 
(Figure 1) and poverty alleviation has been uneven (Figure 3), all states are progressing. 
Of course, no central government operates in a sterilized environment, as the 
variety of outcomes from India’s decentralization efforts illustrate.  Several authors offer 
reasons for the disparity of effects. Some have argued that the increasing economic 
disparity between poor and rich Indian states is evidence of political favoritism and 
lingering symptoms of reliance on central support.32  Others cite varied sub-national 
responses to new external global pressures.33  This theory certainly carries some weight 
as India’s economy is now more open to the global market than ever before.  In addition 
to the several special economic zones established by the central government, it could be 
that some local government leaders have capitalized on lower trade restrictions and have 
simply done a better job of attracting foreign investors.  Saez even notes that “economic 
liberalization has transformed federal relations in India from intergovernmental 
cooperation between the central government and the states towards interjurisdictional 
competition among the states.”34 
                                                 
31 John Lewis argues that India’s sheer size (giantism) creates problems that may be mitigated by 
decentralization.  John P. Lewis, “Some Consequences of Giantism: The Case of India,” World Politics 43 
(1991): 367. 
32 Amaresh Bagchi, “Rethinking Federalism: Changing Power Relations Between the Center and the 
States,” Publius 33, no. 4 (October 1, 2003):  36-37. 
33 Aseema Sinha, “Global Linkages and Domestic Politics: Trade Reform and Institution Building in 
India in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 40 (2007): 1183. 
34 Lawrence Saez, “India's Economic Liberalization, Interjurisdictional Competition and 
Development,” Contemporary South Asia 8 (1999): 323-345. 
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Another explanation for variation in development is that the decentralization is 
itself being unevenly applied.  It could be that the horizontal fiscal imbalances among 
Indian states are so great that there is no incentive for the central government to truly 
cede more fiscal authority to the sub-national governments.  There is some empirical 
evidence which supports this: states have different taxing authority granted to them by 
the center.35  States whose budgetary needs are met mostly by central grants, with less 
funding coming from their own constituents, are more obligated to abide by central 
policies and less inclined to protest ill designed policies.  A possible outcome is that anti-
insurgency, pro-growth, or anti-poverty schemes are not implemented or are incapable of 
being supported within the highly dependent state. 
A study of other developing countries yields another possible explanation for 
India’s uneven development.  It has been observed in several developing countries that 
decentralization, though publicly promoted by the central government, is not practiced in 
reality.36  Some Indian states, possibly, are not adequately translating the national policy 
of decentralization into better services and participation, but are merely spreading 
existing bureaucratic institutions away from the center.  Some of the cases in this thesis 
supports this claim.  Alternatively, the decentralization may not have been complete – 
that is, political decentralization was not accompanied by fiscal decentralization.  The 
central government, despite the national economic liberalization, has maintained control 
of about 75% of a states income, for example.37  Whether the states or the center is 
responsible for hindering fiscal decentralization is less important than understanding the 
effects it has on local stability, economy, and security. 
                                                 
35 Saez, 328. 
36 Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Robert M. McNab, “Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth,” 
World Development 31, no. 9 (September 2003): 1597; Anna Taranchieva, “Fiscal Decentralization in the 
Kyrgyz Republic,” Problems of Economic Transition 49, no. 12 (2007): 6-36. 
37 Saez, 328. 
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D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Definition of “Decentralization” 
In this thesis, the main focus is on center-state relations, though the effects of 
decentralization on poverty do require examining the degree and scope authority reaches 
down to lower levels of government.  Decentralization refers to the movement of fiscal 
and political authority from higher to lower levels of government unless the word “fiscal” 
or “political” immediately precedes it.  Fiscal and political authority is not assumed to be 
connected and the mechanisms governing the decentralization of each can be isolated 
from the other.  This is an important distinction because it is quite possible for the center 
to cede political authority to the states without ceding fiscal authority, and vice versa.  
Many would argue that decentralizing one without the other is no decentralization at all 
since it takes money to operate even a modest government.  Arguably, if no fiscal 
authority is granted to a local government, it is less likely to meet the needs or deliver the 
desired services to its citizens, no matter how well local preferences are represented 
within the government.  In fact, some central governments that announce legitimate 
political decentralization initiatives in an effort to appease citizen demands do so 
knowing that they still will retain fiscal authority over the respective state.  Also, 
relocating seats of authority from the national capitol to subordinate districts is often 
misconstrued as decentralization when, in fact, no actual relinquishing of authority to the 
subordinate districts occurred.   This highlights the importance of understanding the 
relationship between fiscal and political decentralization as well as the importance of 
examining both aspects of decentralization policies. This paper will show many of India’s 
fiscal and political decentralization policies have largely been decoupled from the other, 
either at the center or at the state and lower levels, thereby reducing developmental gains. 
2. Definition of “Development” 
“Development,” of course, has many components.  Literacy, birth rates, gender 
equality, economic growth rates, average life spans, corruption, and others have been 
used to measure the development of a region, a political entity, or a cultural group.  For 
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the scope of this thesis, only three aspects of development will be explored: security, 
poverty, and economic growth.  While many of the other components are linked to the 
three examined in this thesis – higher corruption rates negatively affect economic growth, 
for example – these three are highly visible in India.  They also represent pillars of 
development: a secure environment allows the development of infrastructure, increased 
investment leads to economic growth, which is linked to poverty reduction in the 
presence of redistributive mechanisms, reducing the likelihood of insurgent activity.  
These components of development have been chosen also for their seemingly 
contradictory affinities for decentralization, as mentioned earlier. 
For this thesis, security will be measured in terms of violence directed against 
central institutions for political and economic reasons.  As discussed previously, 
arguments that link governmental decentralization and insurgency are rare, but some 
assumptions can be made about the connection based on related literature.  While shifting 
political and fiscal authority to the periphery might assuage sub-national grievances, it 
might also give disaffected groups a more powerful voice with which to mobilize 
political support as well as the financial means to physically improve their ability to resist 
the central government.  Empirical evidence can be provided to support both sides of the 
argument.38  This suggests that there are conditions under which successful 
decentralization occurs and not simply a theory that decentralization either promotes or 
impedes insurgency. 
Economic growth rate data for each state are also readily available.  While growth 
rate variances between states were largely muted prior to 1991 (and difficult to quantify 
due to the division and creation of states), post-1991 liberalization policies yielded huge 
gains in per capita economic growth in some states and only small gains in others, 
regardless of income levels prior to liberalization.  Furthermore, national growth rates 
varied over time as different national policies gained or lost traction.  These differences 
in growth patterns, correlated with differences in decentralization policies will add to the 
theories highlighted in the above literature. 
                                                 
38 Kristin M. Bakke and Erik Wibbels, “Diversity, Disparity, and Civil Conflict in Federal States,” 
World Politics 59 (2006): 1-27, 29-32, 34, and 36-V. 
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Poverty rates for each state are readily available and indicate a state’s ability to 
redistribute wealth, or, within the framework of a highly centralized institution, the 
failure of the central government’s poverty reduction efforts to reach those who need it.  
The issue of poverty reduction has periodically been the top priority of various political 
parties in India.39  While overall poverty has been reduced over the decades, the progress 
is not even across the country and, as such, offers fertile research material. 
3. Methodology 
The following chapters will examine the relationship of political decentralization 
and fiscal decentralization with each of the three aspects of development outlined above.  
Various periods of India’s political economy and a comparison among Indian states and 
regions will show different degrees of decentralization, different environments, and the 
resulting different degrees of development.  As mentioned, the many other ever-present 
variables will be introduced when and if they significantly impact the decentralization-
development analysis. 
Chapter II specifically analyzes the effect of decentralization on insurgent 
movements.  State-to-state comparisons of decentralization policies and insurgency-
related violence most clearly enunciate under what conditions decentralization reduces 
insurgent behavior.  The insurgencies in Punjab, the northeastern states, and the lack of 
insurgent violence in Tamil Nadu are specifically examined in relation to the amount of 
power the central government granted or withdrew from those individual states at various 
times. 
Though the economic performance of states also varies, especially since 1991, the 
decentralization-growth relationship is best borne out through a periodic comparison of 
the nation’s aggregate growth.  Chapter III analyzes the decentralization policies over  
 
 
                                                 
39 Baldev Raj Nayar, “The Political Economy of India’s Economic Performance Since 1947,” in The 
India Handbook: Prospects onto the 21st Century, ed. C. Steven LaRue (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn 
Publishers, 1997), 45. 
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four distinct periods from 1947 to the present, that each had its own pattern of economic 
growth.  Periods of stunted growth correlates to high degrees of central control and vice 
versa. 
The relationship between decentralization and poverty reduction is a more 
difficult connection to make.  Chapter IV highlights some successes of India’s anti-
poverty efforts through the prism of decentralization policies over time and across states.  
The evidence shows that poverty reduction was most successful under decentralizing 
policies; but the connection is thin as other aspects of poverty alleviation produced 
stronger relationships to the outcome of anti-poverty efforts. 
It is understood that insurgent violence, economic growth, and poverty are not the 
only measures by which “development” is measured.  Arguably, the best measures of 
“development” have yet to be determined.  But, within the context of 2008, most 
academics agree, at least in part, that physical violence against other humans and the 
inability of one human to sustain himself in this day and age are two of the biggest 
problems facing the human race today.  Since most solutions seem to involve high cost, 
the measurement of economic growth has been included in this study.  The end result will 
yield a rough yardstick as to how much and when the central government of a developing 
country should cede power to achieve high marks in development. 
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II. DECENTRALIZATION AND INSURGENCY 
A. DECENTRALIZATION AND SECURITY WITHIN INDIA 
In general, it is believed that serving the population by providing adequate 
representation and improving their quality of life reduces the incentives for insurgency.40   
Applying those theories to India would lead one to conclude two things.  First, India’s 
impressive economic performance over the past fifteen years will have relieved much of 
the financial basis for insurgency.  Second, decentralization efforts over the past fifty 
years should have undercut many of the grievance-based insurgencies in India as 
previously under-represented groups gain legitimate power within the government. 
Unfortunately, such clear-cut outcomes are not evident.  After the turbulence of 
partition, pockets of secessionist movements developed in various Indian states, and 
some remain active.  The northeastern states are notorious hotbeds of insurgent activity.  
Punjab was quite active in the 80s, and relatively new strains of Islamist movements have 
sprouted in the late 90s.  The state government handled these secessionist and 
revolutionary insurgent movements with different political and economic strategies.  
Military and paramilitary assistance from the center has also played an important role in 
the suppression of these insurgencies.  This chapter explores the connection between 
political and fiscal decentralization policies and the development of insurgences in 
selected states. 
Understanding the current relationship between the country’s decentralization 
efforts and insurgency requires a background on these two aspects in the Indian context.  
The establishment of India as an independent state was a robust challenge. The central 
government needed to legitimize itself domestically and internationally while also 
ensuring that the multitude of cultures – over 30 languages, 50,000 castes, and half a 
million villages – were adequately represented in the fledgling democracy.  Eager to shed 
the British colonial rule, early Indian leaders also appreciated the potential British 
                                                 
40 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington, D.C.: 
Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 93.  
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institutions that ran the country under the colonial administration.41  The political elite 
that inherited the country from the English felt that only way to bring together the 
multiple cultural Indian society was to strengthen and increase the size of the central 
government. Although at some level, there was recognition of the importance of local 
governments, especially in the form of panchayats, promoted by Mahatma Gandhi. 
However, under Nehru, in the event of an emergency caused by socially disruptive 
forces, ultimate authority was given to the Prime Minister – an option exercised on 
occasion – but, constitutionally, the legislative branch was granted the greater degree of 
day-to-day power. 
While India’s central government was able to keep its arms around the potentially 
disruptive social cleavages and the layers of bureaucracy grew.  The resulting stability 
allowed local and regional political parties to become more organized.  The 
demographics of the legislative branch changed from one dominated by a single party to 
one in which many smaller parties formed tenuous alliances based on the issues.  
Recognition that the various cultural groups needed a greater voice in governmental 
affairs led to the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in 1992 which mandated the 
creation of locally elected governments at the village level.42  This was accompanied by a 
culling of ineffective or inefficient bureaucratic institutions and a liberalization of 
economic policies.  These last two alterations have been generally recognized as the 
principal reason for India’s consistently strong growth over the past fifteen years.  In 
terms of insurgency theory, then, there are fewer reasons for insurgency within India with 
greater opportunity for political participation and strong national economic performance. 
Aside from isolated instances of events-led violence, organized insurgencies 
began to get real traction in the 1960s and 70s.  Generally, the violence can be 
categorized into two types of insurgency: revolutionary and secessionist.  Maoist 
organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Indian government bloomed 
around the late 1960s, were largely suppressed during the 1970s, and have seen a steady 
                                                 
41 Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2001), 18. 
42 Lawrence Saez, “India's Economic Liberalization, Interjurisdictional Competition and 
Development,” Contemporary South Asia 8 (1999): 323-345. 
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increase in influence since the turn of the century.  Naxalism, which typifies this 
movement, is still considered a serious threat to the central government’s legitimacy and 
has significant influence throughout much of the country.43  India’s newfound economic 
growth has not suppressed the birth of new revolutionary organizations, either, as groups 
like the Student’s Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) have emerged from a loosely 
organized group to one that truly began to command national attention as late as 2000.44  
Northeastern India is home to some explicitly secessionist movements; and the Sikh 
insurgencies, also secessionist, have been active from the 1970s and still retain strong 
organizational capacities.45  In summary, leftist, ethno-nationalist, and Islamist 
organizations have continued to survive amid India’s economic liberalization and 
political decentralization.  A closer look, however, will reveal that, like India’s 
decentralization efforts, the increase or decrease of insurgent activity is not uniform 
throughout the country. 
B. PUNJAB 
Even though Punjab has been one of the sub-continent’s wealthiest states in per 
capita terms, it also saw some of the highest levels of instability and violence during the 
1980s and 1990s.  The civil war-like conditions were so horrible, with deaths from 
violence topping out around 5,000 people annually. Since then Punjab has earned the 
label of “model state” by some authors in that it was not only able to avert a total 
meltdown but return to a state of “normalcy” while high levels of insurgent violence 
persisted in other states.46  While prospects for continued stability in Punjab are 
comforting, it is not necessarily a model of good governance but more an example of the 
difficulties India’s central government faces in ceding authority to its state governments. 
                                                 
43 As a testament to the scale of the problem, in April 2006 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated 
that the Naxalites was the "single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country," according 
to the article “India politics: Naxalites pose internal security threat,” EIU ViewsWire, New York, October 
25, 2006. 
44 “Student’s Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/simi.htm (accessed November 29, 2007). 
45 South Asia Terrorism Portal. 
46 Gurharpal Singh, “Punjab Since 1984,” Asian Survey 36, no. 4 (April 1, 1996): 410. 
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Having inherited the largest concentration of Sikhs after Partition, who in turn had 
had vociferous segments of their society lobbying for their own nation-state prior to 
1947, Indian Punjab became an instant insurgency threat in the eyes of the central 
government.  Any calls for political decentralization by Akali Dal, the Sikh-dominant 
party, were interpreted as secessionist.  Despite some brief times of hope wherein the 
central government promised greater degrees of self-governance to the state, 
notwithstanding the Rajiv-Longowal Accord of 1984, the national Congress party never 
followed through to a significant degree.47  The gradual escalation of Sikh-led violence 
as a reaction to the failed promises was met with the escalation of Indian troops in Punjab 
as well as a centralization of political power, to include the complete dismissal of the 
Punjab government in May 1987.  Increased security expenditures and numbers of 
security personnel (both state police and national troops) were accompanied by 
increasingly heavy-handed tactics, which in turn created more civilian casualties, 
accounting for 31% of all security-related deaths between 1984 and 1994.48 
For better or for worse, the center’s brutal tactics, including a thorough infiltration 
of militant Sikh social networks, eventually pacified Punjab and created a political legacy 
that carries opposing meanings depending on the interpreter: On one hand, the 
suppression of terrorism in the state legitimizes central authority despite the perpetuation 
of disenfranchised Sikh civilians who continue to be caught in the crossfire.  On the other 
hand, the Punjab case discredits the notion that India is a group of states voluntarily 
unified by a prevalent sense of Indian nationality, when such centralized political and 
military means are required to maintain the peace.49  In an opposing example of the 
center’s decentralization efforts regarding Punjab, earlier Sikh demands for a Sikh-
dominant state were finally granted in 1966 by the government of India, and insurgent 
violence was largely defused.50 
                                                 
47 Gurharpal Singh, “The Punjab Legislative Assembly Elections of February 1997: The BJP's 
Regional Road to Power?” Contemporary South Asia 6, no. 3 (1997): 273-283. 
48 Gurharpal Singh, “Punjab Since 1984,” Asian Survey 36, no. 4 (April 1, 1996): 413-414. 
49 Jugdep S. Chima, “The Punjab Crisis,” Asian Survey 34, no. 10 (October 1, 1994): 848. 
50 Atul Kohli, “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism?  The Rise and Decline of Self-
Determination Movements in India,” in Community Conflicts and the State in India, ed. Amrita Basu and 
Atul Kohli (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 22. 
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Stingy decentralization of political authority is a lasting legacy of the center’s 
early-1990s tactics which, due to the reduction of violence, exemplifies to many 
observers a model for good central governance.51  Even in 2008, “local government 
cannot be said to be highly developed in Punjab” according to the state’s official website; 
and though village panchayats exist, “they do not wield administrative or legal powers of 
any consequence.”52 
With a large agricultural sector, the state benefited greatly from the reforms of the 
Green Revolution; but the newfound economic inflows of the time, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter, created schisms within Sikh political 
institutions that may have prevented a front united enough to present a credible 
alternative to the controlling center.53  The recent alliance between Akali Dal (Badal) and 
BJP, justified largely by a common interest in disassembling the dominance of the 
Congress party which had so harshly suppressed Sikh militancy, resulted in a rise to 
prominence of the Akali Dal (B) and BJP in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, winning 
80% of the seats in 1997.54 
While Punjab is considered a relatively peaceful state today, it has experienced an 
extended period of mass violence that seemed to skip other regions of the country which 
had similar ethnic-based movements.  The central government relinquished some 
authority to the state, but it has come after considerable financial and social costs; and has 
perhaps even created barriers to future cooperative negotiations between state leaders and 
the center. 
C. NORTHEAST INDIA 
The source of violence in northeastern India is more diverse, and in some cases 
more justified, than the politically-motivated movements in Punjab.  To begin with, 
                                                 
51 Gurharpal Singh, “Punjab Since 1984,” Asian Survey 36, no. 4 (April 1, 1996): 418. 
52 Government of Punjab, http://punjabgovt.nic.in/government/government1.htm (accessed January 
28, 2008). 
53 Jugdep S. Chima, “The Punjab Crisis,” Asian Survey 34, no. 10 (October 1, 1994): 849. 
54 Gurharpal Singh, “The Punjab Legislative Assembly Elections of February 1997: The BJP's 
Regional Road to Power?” Contemporary South Asia 6, no. 3 (1997): 278. 
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independent kingdoms comprised much of the Northeast and were swept up into India 
either through British regional expansion prior to Indian independence or in the few years 
immediately following.  The influx of Hindu Bengalis at Partition and afterward created 
massive demographic shifts which in turn affected voting outcomes (for those areas that 
could vote).  Indigenous tribal units, whose lands were being infringed upon by 
immigrants, gradually began resorting to violence to highlight their grievances to the 
state and central governments. 
The state of Assam initially encompassed the states now known as Nagaland, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Arunachal Pradesh.  Tripura and Manipur were annexed by 
India in 1949 and were completely under the control of the central government.  
Therefore, the entire northeastern part of the country was represented by one fractious 
state or was directly administered by the central government for the first ten to fifteen 
years of India’s self rule. 
Religious, cultural, and language differences kept Northeast Indian societies 
fragmented.  This fragmentation alone may not have been sufficient to instigate the 
waves of violence that followed, but the situation was not static.  Partition led to several 
million Hindu Bengalis immigrating to West Bengal, Assam, and the surrounding 
kingdoms, continuing insidiously for decades.  This created a competition for resources 
as indigenous tribes began to lose access to land traditionally used for their own 
subsistence. 
Tribal groups within Assam reverted to violence when the state government failed 
to address their demands for government services; and after relatively brief periods of 
central government intervention, political autonomy as a state was granted.  The Nagas of 
eastern Assam, following a campaign of violence against government institutions was 
granted statehood in 1963.  The 1959 famine in what is now Mizoram touched off a 
movement which demanded greater autonomy due to lack of famine relief provided by 
the government.  As the movement gained momentum and became more violent, the 
central government supported a strong military retaliation, using bomber aircraft against 
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its own citizens for the first time.55  Protracted and interrupted negotiations, however, 
eventually led to the formation of Mizoram in 1987. 
The two previously independent territories of Tripura and Manipur have 
undergone dissimilar trajectories of violence despite similar beginnings.  Both are border-
states (Tripura with Bangladesh and Manipur with Burma) which present significant 
counter-insurgency challenges as it gives separatists an area to which they can retreat if 
pursued.  The main source of insurgent violence in Tripura originates from ethnic 
Tripurans who, having gone from making up 85% of the population to less than 30%, 
have lost land and political power to relatively recent Hindu Bengali immigrants.56  
Countering the violence of the Tripura Peoples Democratic Front (TPDF) and National 
Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), which seek to reestablish an independent Tripuran 
country, is adequately handled by state-run police forces.57  Manipur, on the other hand, 
is one of the most violent areas in the region.58  Though some of the violence is inter-
tribal, its persistence and the blatant attacks on government institutions are indicative of 
the small amount of control authorities actually wield.  Manipur is more like Punjab than 
Tripura in one main regard: the militants represent the ethnic majority in their respective 
state. 
So the central government has pursued a variety of policies in addressing violent 
movements in the Northeast and Punjab.  In the cases of some northeastern territories, the 
central government went so far as to grant full statehood to disgruntled ethnic groups.  
Where ethnic militants were outnumbered at the voting booths, residual violence has 
been contained, to varying degrees, by state-run police actions.  In present-day Manipur, 
and Punjab in the 1980s and 90s, the central government has ceded little authority to the 
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state, possibly out of fear of an actual secession.  Over time, the heavy-handed military 
tactics in Punjab were able to stamp out the major impetus of the more extreme violent 
factions; one wonders if the same effort will produce the same results in Manipur which 
is, by far, less developed than Punjab was. 
At first glance it appears as if the over-centralization of authority instigated the 
movements responsible for most of the violence.  Because the central government, which 
had assumed or taken over the authority for the regions examined above, were not able to 
effectively deliver the highly specific and individual services to multiple distinct ethnic 
groups, what started as political movements for change turned violent.  But what effect 
did decentralization (or lack thereof) have on mitigating violence?  Did the violence itself 
affect the centralization policies?  Attacks on government infrastructure might burden a 
state government to such a degree as to necessitate the centralization of authority, as has 
been suggested in the case of Manipur.59  Comparing these states to a state that had 
capable governing institutions sheds some light on this relationship. 
D. TAMIL NADU 
The tribes of northeastern India and the Sikhs of Punjab do not represent the only 
occurrence of ethnic perturbations within the country.  Why have not all of India’s ethnic 
movements resulted in mass violence?  The political jockeying in Tamil Nadu was quite 
vigorous in the 1950s and 1960s, but violence was not as popular a political tool as in 
Punjab in the 1980s, Kashmir in the 1990s, and the northeastern states up to present 
times.  What was the difference between Tamil Nadu (and most of the other southern 
states) and the states that did experience violence; and, specifically for this thesis, was 
there a difference in the relationship between the center and the state? 
Democracy itself can be said to be a source of ethnic violence.  Since 
representation encourages mobilization of a group or groups of voters, ethnicity, which is 
frequently easy to determine through physical appearance, religious practices, or 
language is used to motivate voters.  Feelings of “us versus them” are more easily 
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perpetuated, even when such feelings did not previously exist, if the risk of not 
coalescing includes losing political authority or economic advantages.  In a study of 
ethnic violence in India, Atul Kohli describes this progression of group identity, group 
mobilization, followed by power negotiation with the center as a regularly repeated 
phenomenon within India.60 
The case of the Tamils, in the state originally known as Madras, supports this 
claim; and the case for secession may have been easier to make than in other parts of 
India.  The Tamils speak a Dravidian language, notably different from the Indo-Germanic 
languages of northern India; and it is tangible evidence of the Tamils’ distinct historical 
narrative from that of what is thought to be “Indian.”  Tamil political leaders capitalized 
on this and other differences in mobilizing support not only for state lines based on 
language, but for the creation of a Dravidistan.  So some could certainly make the 
argument that ethnic Tamils had a stronger case for secession than Punjabi Sikhs, and 
would therefore be more prone to mass violence in achieving independence; but this did 
not happen. 
Brahmins were frequently the foci of Tamil anti-center rhetoric.  Since most high-
level government offices were held by Brahmins, and Brahmins typically had fairer skin 
than ethnic Tamils, they were used by Tamil leaders to personify not only the central 
government’s control of the area, but also the domination of the North over the South.  It 
was all the more easier for Tamils to lobby so vigorously for such decentralization since 
Brahmins made up far less the population than in other parts of India: only 5% of Tamil 
society was made up of Brahmins as compared to 10% in most other parts of India.61 
For the first ten years of India’s independence, a variety of ethnic groups across 
the country lobbied for greater authority, requesting a redrawing of state lines to reflect 
the actual language and cultural differences between neighboring regions, the Tamils 
included.  Nehru was rightfully concerned about relenting to such pressure as secessionist 
movements might gain sufficient momentum to actually trigger secessions across the 
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subcontinent.  In the 1950s, he did agree to new state lines to assuage growing ethnic 
grievances, but the constitutional fiscal restraints ensured much authority was retained in 
the center.62 
Although Tamil Nadu was not immune from violence, the mass efforts against 
central authority were largely peaceful.  Ethnic Tamil leaders directed the opposition 
against Congress domination through protests and the creation of substantial opposition 
parties.  First through the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party, then the Anna 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK) party, ethnic Tamils were able to gain political 
advantage over the center-sponsored Congress party by the mid 1960s.63  To this day, 
control of the state’s Assembly is hotly contested by those two main parties, with the 
Congress party and several small local parties often deciding the outcome through 
alliances with one of the big two; but mass violence was never, and will most likely not 
ever be, a feature of Tamil Nadu’s political environment. 
E. A SUMMATION OF THE DIFFERENCES 
There are many variables which can be attributed to the likelihood or not of 
insurgent violence across India; and even though this thesis is specifically examining the 
impact of decentralization on violence, those variables must at the very least be 
acknowledged to avoid assigning too much or too little credit to decentralization as a 
factor.  Location, geography, demography, wealth, infrastructure, outside influences and 
historical narrative have all been successfully identified as significant contributors to 
violence in regions around the world; and the states studied in this chapter are not 
exempt. 
The first commonality among Punjab and the northeastern states is that they are 
all located along international borders.  While Tamil Nadu is on the “edge” of Indian 
sovereign territory, an ocean is more substantial a barrier against movement than a fence 
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or, in some parts of India, simply a line on a map.  The southeastern state is not immune 
from insurgent traffic across its shores, as Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination by a Sri Lankan 
Tamil illustrates; but it can never be to the degree offered by direct abutment of a 
neighboring country – especially if the country is sympathetic to cross-border insurgents. 
Such is the case for Punjab and Manipur in particular.  Pakistan was not reluctant, 
particularly during the regional nuclear buildup of the 1980s and 1990s, to promote any 
sort of disturbance which put pressure on the Indian central government; so militant 
Sikhs had an arms supplier if and when needed.  Similarly, ethnic Manipuris can still find 
refuge with sympathetic Burmese tribes marginalized by their own central government.64 
In the cases of Punjab and the Northeast, centralizing policies do not seem to have 
been a trigger to violence.  In both regions, violence became more pronounced and 
widespread many years after distinct centralization initiatives.  In the case of some 
northeastern states, ethnic militancy gained traction a decade or more after the central 
government completely revoked all sub-national authority by annexing previously 
independent kingdoms. 
Under certain conditions, there does appear to be a correlation between 
decentralization and violence, however, once mass violence has begun.  Where there was 
a relatively sturdy structure of local governance (established political parties, a 
responsible judiciary and executive branch, and the capacity to fund the government), 
revoking sub-national authority promoted continued resistance (Punjab).  Ceding 
authority under such conditions seems to have reduced the momentum of violent 
movements (Tripura, Punjab, some northeastern states).  Though the center has ceded 
some power to Manipur in granting it statehood, it has not had the same effect on the 
level of violence as it did in other areas with greater political and economic capacity. 
When the center imposed Hindi language requirements on Tamil Nadu – a blatant 
attempt to centralize authority – there was tremendous resistance from a majority of 
citizens; but violence was not a dominant characteristic of the resistance as it was under 
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similar policies in Punjab.  One difference between the two states which might explain 
this observation is the legacy of political institutions within each.  Ethnic Tamils had 
occupied the same territory for centuries, and had a developed infrastructure of 
governance.  Decentralization of authority to the Bodos of Assam, where a stable civil 
society had also previously existed, helped extinguish the violence of that movement 
fairly quickly.65  Though the concessions made were from the state to a local level, the 
central government was instrumental in the arrangement which exemplifies how 
decentralization can positively impact ethnic-based violence deeper than just the state 
level.  In contrast, the demographics and many of the societal institutions of Punjab were 
rewritten during Partition, as was much of northern India. 
In summation, the degree of decentralization amongst our case studies does not 
seem to be a critical instigating element of violence, which can (with few exceptions) be 
explained by traditional insurgency theory.  Generally, peaceful ethnic movements 
existed with a backdrop of an historically substantial civil society or were mitigated by a 
peaceful majority.  The impact of decentralization, then, seems to either be a defusing 
factor before violence has erupted or a dynamic factor of violence continuation: the rate 
and degree of decentralization (or centralization) during periods of unrest may perpetuate 
or escalate violence depending on the strength of sub-national civil institutions and the 
capacity of sub-national governments. 
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III. DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
A. PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
From Independence onward, India’s political elite struggled to find a balance 
between popular demand for socialist policies in a poor democracy and economic growth 
within the ideologies of self-reliance and non-alignment.  Liberalizing parts of the 
economy to eliminate inefficiencies risked losing support of voters, most of whom were 
poor.  Coupled with the elite’s sense of nationalism and the desire to keep all of India’s 
cultural groups under one flag, it is easy to understand why centralist policies were so 
popular.  However, external factors and internal financial duress created pressure for 
decentralization.  To understand the effects decentralization has had on economic growth 
upon Indian states, it is important to look at the shift of political and fiscal authority over 
time, superimposed over economic performance.  In addition to the difference in periodic 
aggregate growth rates and growth rates between states, there is also a difference in urban 
and rural growth rates.  These differences, as well as the degree of central control over 
rural areas, are distinct throughout the country.  This chapter is subdivided among four 
distinct periods of Indian economic growth.  Within each section, an analysis of Indian 
political economy showing the degree of centralization and the forces acting on the 
central government is followed by a breakdown of economic performance during that 
period. 
1. 1947-1965: Highly Centralized, Socialized, Industrialized 
It is imprudent to analyze the political economy of India during this period 
without acknowledging the trends in centralization leading up to Independence.  Looking 
back at the sub-continent, one can see a pattern of centralization and decentralization over 
the past one to two hundred years.  In the 1800s, independent kingdoms attempted to 
maintain their sovereignty to the maximum extent possible in the face of British 
colonialism.  Toward the end of the century, various movements intent on ousting the 
colonial powers utilized a greater degree of coordination across the empire in the pursuit 
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of independence.  As such, regional and cultural differences were set aside for the time 
being, and authority began shifting to central institutions to coordinate a united front 
against the British. 
In the 1930s and 1940s, an assortment of groups presented economic plans for the 
soon-to-be independent country.  Nehru headed a National Planning Committee formed 
by the INC; leading businessmen espoused the widely held view of industrialization as a 
means to self-sufficiency; and the departing British rulers established a planning 
department which also promoted industrialization.66  In opposition to those highly 
centralized plans, Gandhian elites proposed a decentralized plan reliant on small, 
localized industries and local policy-making to accommodate India’s various cultures.67  
Several factors played into the ultimate decision to place greater economic authority in 
the hands of the central government.  The Great Depression disenfranchised many policy-
makers regarding capitalism, and the Soviet model of state-led development seemed the 
most compatible with Indian ideals.68  Furthermore, the association of capitalism with 
colonialism was still strong enough to make a market-driven economy distasteful to many 
policy-makers.69  The Gandhian plan was therefore dismissed outright and the structure 
for a centralized economic system took form under the leadership of the Indian National 
Congress (INC) party.   
Political authority was also centralized around this time.  Once independence was 
gained, the ruling elites, anticipating the fragmentation of pre-colonial cultures, 
constitutionally imposed barriers that would impede secessionist tendencies.  The seventh 
schedule of India’s massive constitution spells out the responsibilities of the central 
government and those of the states line by line.  The responsibilities of the center include 
those normally associated with federal governments: the defense of the country (#1) and 
all of the activities supporting such an endeavor, foreign relations with other countries 
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(#10), national highways and infrastructure (#23), all currency (#36), and the like.  
Particular to India, the central government also has authority over other aspects of the 
society not always seen in federations: all railroads (#22), regulation of all industries and 
businesses, and the all-inclusive #97, “Any other matter not enumerated in List II [the 
State list] or List III [the shared responsibilities] including any tax not mentioned in either 
of those Lists.”  The central government also reserved the right to assume control of 
individual states whenever it deemed necessary.  Of particular importance is the fact that 
the state government, not the central government, has authority over all aspects of the 
agricultural sector (Figure 4).  As will be shown later, this structure of fiscal authority has 
greatly influenced the behavior of state governments. 
Figure 4.   Central and State Areas of Authority. 
“The Hindu rate of growth,” as one Indian economist described the quaint 
economic performance up to 1988, belies the variations in growth that did occur from 
1947 onward.70  The strong self-reliance themes evident through the country’s birth and 
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List I (Union Authority) 
Industries (#52) 
Opium (#59) 
Film industry (#60) 
Inter-state migration (#81) 
Taxes on non-farm income (#82) 
Taxes on tobacco, but not liquor (#84) 
Corporate tax (#85) 
Capital taxes, not including agricultural land 
(#86) 
Estate taxes, not including agricultural land 
(#87) 
Taxes on inter-state sales (#92) 
List II (State Authority) 
Public health and sanitation (#6) 
Disability relief (#9) 
Agriculture (#14) 
Livestock (#15) 
Trade within the state (#26) 
Taxes on agricultural income (#46) 
Taxes on agricultural land (#47-48) 
Taxes on land and buildings (#49) 
Taxes on liquor and opium (#51) 
Taxes on entry of goods (#52) 
Taxes on electricity (#53) 
Taxes on professions (#60) 
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early years of independence created a pattern of economic isolation that set the country 
up for crisis in later years.  While self-reliance had the effect of diversifying domestic 
sectors and keeping foreign debt low, it inhibited productivity and technological advances 
that were happening outside its borders.71 
The first three Five Year Plans produced average annual growth rates of 3.7%, 
4%, and 2.8%, respectively.72  They each stressed the industrialization of the country 
given the strong consensus within India’s ruling elite for self-sufficiency and the 
dominance of the industrialism theory as a means of development.73  The plans 
themselves set annual growth targets during their respective periods of 3%, 5%, and 6% 
respectively.  Per capita growth rates of the net domestic product for the same periods 
were only 2.6%, 2.0%, and 0.4%.74  Despite the growing gap between actual performance 
and target performance numbers, the overall average gain of 3.5% validated the country’s 
inward-looking plan in that its industrial sectors had expanded and, perhaps more 
importantly, that the government survived.  The fact that industrialization was augmented 
by significant Soviet support and food shortages were covered by the United States, eager 
to offload its surplus, masked some fundamental problems with the country’s economic 
structure.75  Economic policies would continue to subjugate the agricultural sectors to 
industrial expansion; and the private sector, which significantly contributed to growth 
during these periods, was viewed as a rising threat to the socialist agenda.  The Third 
Five Year Plan states, “It is a basic premise in India's Five Year Plans that, through 
democracy and widespread public participation, development along socialist lines will 
secure rapid economic growth.”76  The ruling elites’ commitment to a centralized 
economic system remained intact despite signs of weakness. 
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2. 1966-1974: Reluctant Liberalization 
The political landscape of the country became more unstable during this period.  
After Nehru died in 1964, his successor, Shastri, lasted a little less than two years before 
Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, was installed as an untested national leader.  In addition 
to the uncertainty over India’s future, internal and external forces on the country’s 
governing regime caused shifts in policy that both decentralized and centralized 
authority.  However, pressures for decentralization were overlooked or mitigated 
whenever possible in favor of more socialist policies. 
First, the wars with China and Pakistan toward the end of the previous period 
(1962 and 1965, respectively) reinforced the importance of public industrialization over 
agriculture and private sectors.77  The droughts of 1965 and 1966 brought to light the 
serious inadequacies of India’s agricultural sector, and enabled Shastri, who favored 
more liberal reforms, to initiate pro-agriculture policies which ultimately blossomed into 
the Green Revolution.78  Indira Gandhi was obliged to continue the reforms in as much as 
they were required simply to keep the country’s economy afloat (and maintain popular 
support from the country’s rural poor); but high inflation led to drastic cutbacks in public 
investment, debilitating the infrastructure required for sustained production levels.79 
Significant changes in the country’s political landscape which began earlier began 
to manifest themselves in political instability at both the state and national levels.  Since 
segments of Indian society identified more strongly with their linguistic and cultural 
heritages, they created pressure for greater decentralization by granting authority to these 
sub-national groups.  Ultimately, the center relented and state lines were redrawn in the 
1950s to more accurately reflect the cultural and linguistic groups contained therein, but 
fiscal control remained firmly rooted in central institutions.  The political parties that had 
formed along cultural lines in the pursuit of distinct states developed fissures as elites 
now mobilized around ideologies.  Instead of continuing the pattern of decentralization 
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by seeking secession for the newly created Tamil Nadu, Tamil elites debated a range of 
political philosophies for government, for instance.80  Hardliners at the center resisted 
these developments, and eventually Indira Gandhi began a campaign of centralization, 
liberally invoking President’s Rule and Emergency Rule. 
As the Congress Party began to split along conservative and liberal lines, Indira 
Gandhi embarked on a populist (and highly leftist) campaign of centralization.  Licensing 
regimes were strengthened to combat a rising private sector; former private industries 
were nationalized; and restrictions on foreign investment were fortified.81  Her re-
election in 1971 from a platform of “poverty removal”, and with support from the 
Communist Party of India (CPI), spurred the creation of deeper and stronger centralizing 
policies.82 
With the exception of the Green Revolution, the economic outcome as a result of 
these policies was not good.  Per capita net national product grew at an average 1.1% 
during this time period.83  Investment in infrastructure deteriorated, stifling growth in all 
sectors; and a variety of shocks including drought, subsequent food riots, and 
international pressures culminated in the declaration of a national emergency by Indira 
Gandhi in 1975.84 
3. 1975-1991: Earnest Liberalization 
Political stability did not improve in India during this period.  Indira Gandhi’s 
removal of power in 1977 followed her invocation of Emergency Rule two year earlier.  
Two years later she returned to power when the coalition government that replaced her 
failed to produce solutions to internal problems brought on by highly centralized fiscal 
policies.  In 1984 she was assassinated and Rajiv Gandhi, her non-politician son, came to 
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power for the next five years, after which he was defeated by a coalition of rival parties.  
He, too, was assassinated in 1991 while campaigning for the INC. 
Before her death, Indira Gandhi was forced to carefully liberalize small parts of 
the country’s economy in as much as her party, the INC, would accept a departure from 
their mandate, and to float what was seen as an essential military build-up countering 
increasingly aggressive Pakistani and Chinese border disputes.85  Whereas Indira’s 
reforms were in response to economic crises, Rajiv’s gradually implemented 
liberalization policies were introduced, to the extent the INC and Parliament would allow, 
without similar pressures.86 
Liberalization is not synonymous with decentralization, however.  While Rajiv 
Gandhi’s reforms benefited the private sector and the country as a whole, much fiscal 
control was retained by the central government.  State governments, used to the steady 
income of state-sponsored industries, demanded supplemental grants from the center to 
keep their own state and local governments running.87  The per capita growth rate during 
this period went from 1.2% in the first five-year period from 1975 to 1980, followed by 
3.1% and 3.3% for the next respective periods as the reforms deepened and gained 
traction.88  Rising oil prices in the mid-1970s certainly contributed to the higher growth 
rates as Gulf States increased their demand not only for Indian products, but Indian 
labor.89  The still highly centralized fiscal system only served to accentuate – and Rajiv’s 
reforms only served to delay – the building balance-of-payments crisis which was to 
emerge in 1990 and 1991. 
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4. 1991-Present: Robust Liberalization, Partial Decentralization 
When the Rao government of 1991 introduced liberal policies to the parliament, 
the policies were hotly debated and heavily criticized by the majority opposition party; 
yet vote after vote enacted the leftist proposals from the minority party.90  The success of 
this achievement is even more surprising when considering Rajiv Gandhi’s failed attempt 
to do the same thing only six years earlier while his party had a three-fourths majority in 
parliament.  Another irony is that the reforms were largely responsible for starting India 
on an upward economic trend despite majority opposition.  This phenomenon can be 
explained on a few levels. 
One might describe the liberalization effort championed by the then Finance 
Minister, Manmohan Singh, as sneaking in new laws when the citizens were concerned 
over swelling nationalist movements and associated violence.  Politicians would point to 
the rising nationalist movement as a unifying force between Rao’s minority Congress 
Party (INC) and the majority Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).  Economists would point to 
the balance-of-payments crisis that was hitting the country in 1991 – a liberalize-or-go-
bankrupt situation for the government.  On a more theoretical level, there is an argument 
that describes the liberalization as a case of elite politics versus mass politics.91  The best 
answer is a combination of the above. 
First, explaining why earlier attempts at reforms failed demystifies the dramatic 
difference in liberalization attempts from Rajiv to Rao.  Rajiv Gandhi’s (and the INC’s) 
sweep to power in 1984-1985 can be characterized as a sympathy move by voters after 
his mother, Indira Gandhi, was assassinated.92  The euphoria of the INC regaining the 
majority in parliament and a clean, unblemished non-politician (Rajiv) as the Prime 
Minister obscured from the masses the first reforms he initiated including the 
dismemberment of the economically cumbersome license raj and the reduction of several 
                                                 
90 Ashutosh Varshney, “Mass Politics or Elite Politics?: India’s Economic Reforms in Comparative 
Perspective,” in India in the Era of Economic Reforms, ed. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Ashutosh Varshney, and 
Nirupam Bajpai (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 222-260. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Candland, 23. 
 41
trade barriers.  Varshney argues that the minority BJP was paralyzed politically until 
Rajiv began reducing the farmer and petroleum subsidies – reforms that touched a 
majority of Indians on a daily basis – giving the BJP a new base of constituents from 
which to draw support.93  The Bofors scandal, deviations from his mother’s agenda, 
relatively radical adjustments to foreign policies (courting the U.S., for example), and 
tacit approval for anti-Sikh crimes also contributed to the Prime Minister’s (and the 
INC’s) fall from grace, however.94  Further reform efforts stalled in parliament. 
Narasimha Rao came to power with a more daunting barrier to economic reform: 
a BJP-led parliament.  There was a very peculiar environment surrounding the 
lawmakers, however, which allowed some quite radical reforms to be made into law.  
Economically, India was facing a severe crisis in that “the current level of foreign 
exchange reserves…would suffice to finance imports for a mere fortnight,” according to 
Singh during a 1991 plea to the Lok Sabha.95  As severe as the crisis was, scholars refer 
to the crisis as only an instigator to reforms, not a sustainable engine for reforms.96  
Furthermore, the 1980s had seen a rise in Hindu nationalism, changing the bipolar status 
quo; and while leftist parties strongly opposed the INC, they feared the nationalists more.  
Politically, the spheres of influence were not bipolar as they had been for Rajiv but 
triangular between the BJP, INC, and Hindu nationalists.  Smaller parties like Janata Dal 
desired to keep caste lines in place as their platform centered on lower versus higher 
castes.  Because Hindu nationalists were trying to mobilize Hindus across all castes, 
thereby directly threatening Janata Dal influence, Janata Dal aligned itself with the INC 
for survival, and provided the critical swing votes during budget approval despite their 
caustic remarks.97 
Where Rajiv only touched the surface of trade reforms, Rao used the surprising 
mix of coalitions within parliament to make massive reforms, reducing an 87% average 
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tariff rate in 1990 to around 20% in 1998.98  He de-licensed industries across the country, 
leaving only a few under close government control.  When it came to reforms that 
affected or were visible to more than just elites – politicians, large business owners, and 
investors – Rao was subtler than Rajiv.  Reductions in income taxes were accompanied 
by slight reductions in food and petrol subsidies. 
The successes and failures of both Rajiv and Rao highlight Varshney’s argument 
of elite politics versus mass politics.  Reforms that dealt with elite politics – currency 
valuation, trade liberalization, i.e. – progressed smoothly while those that affected the 
masses succeeded or failed depending on whether the immediate effect was positive or 
negative.  Subtle, long-term, and indirect economic linkages are not capable of arousing 
mass action.99  In summary, the liberalization policies proposed in the early 90s were 
successful because 1) the economic crisis opened the door for renewed debate; 2) the 
political environment caused unlikely coalitions that provided the requisite number of 
votes in parliament; and 3) the reforms were largely in the arena of elite politics.  While 
fiscal control was being relinquished by the central government, however, it was not 
decentralization to lower government authorities.  Rather, the market was given a larger 
role in determining prices and output.  It does mark a shift in mindset among Indian elites 
that may encourage decentralizing policies in the future. 
B. THE PARADOX OF PUNJAB AND THE AG-INDUSTRY DIVIDE 
It has already been shown that the central government, after granting statehood to 
Punjab in the 1960s, has been extremely reluctant to cede more power to the state.  As far 
as insurgent violence, the centralization of power probably lengthened the duration of 
hostilities by reinforcing the political reasons Sikh insurgents were using to mobilize 
support.  During roughly this same period, Punjab had the third highest growth rate of all 
Indian states.100  Does this mean that centralization corresponds to higher economic 
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growth?  Actually, it does not.  For Punjab, and coincidentally the two other states which 
posted higher growth rates than Punjab (Manipur [3.32%] and Haryana [3.0%]), the 
agriculture sector made up a little more than 50% of the state’s net domestic product, 
compared to manufacturing which only comprised about 11%.101  (Manipur’s was 55% 
to 8% and Haryana’s was about 57% to 12%, relatively.)  Furthermore, the amount of 
grants Punjab received from the center as a percentage of its net domestic product was 
one of the lowest of all the states, and was the lowest for the period between 1981 and 
1985 at less than 1%.102 
The correlation between centralized authority and strong economic growth does 
not hold true in this case because, as illustrated earlier, agriculture is the only sector in 
which the state actually does have all the authority over the center: the ability to tax 
agricultural income, agricultural land, and on the inheritance of agricultural land.  
Conversely, the state with the lowest growth rate from 1961 to 1991, West Bengal, 
derived roughly 36% of its net domestic product from agriculture and 23% from 
manufacturing.103 
C. DECENTRALIZATION-ECONOMIC GROWTH CONCLUSIONS 
The present state of India’s economic growth and the fiscal institutions that have 
survived since independence reflect the country’s roots as a centrally managed economy.  
As has been shown, a variety of internal and external forces have either forced or allowed 
ruling regimes to relinquish fiscal and political authority over time.  The early years up to 
1965 produced moderate economic growth which validated the highly centralized 
economic system.  The mild decline in growth over the next period (1966-1974) was not 
attributed to improper planning, and a renewed emphasis on center-controlled 
industrialization in opposition to the private sector put a strain on the country’s economic 
structure.  The period 1975-1991 saw cracks begin to develop in the country’s centrally 
planned development strategy which eventually became critical in 1991, when the 
                                                 




economy was opened to the global market.  Strong individual state performances 
correlate strongly to those with a dominant agricultural sector, the control of which 
resides with the states rather than center. 
Although significant political decentralization policies were implemented over 
time, including the subdivision of states and constitutional reform encouraging political 
involvement from all citizens, the fiscal liberation of the past decades should not be 
confused with fiscal decentralization.  Supply, demand, and pricing regulation has been 
relinquished by the central government to the market, but the constitutional processes and 
fiscal institutions that pertain to center-state financial relationships still exist.  This lack 
of decentralization might help maintain states equality, but troubling symptoms in India’s 
present-day economy suggest that aggregate growth and development are stifled by 
central planning. 
The center-run Finance and Planning Commissions, and the dependency of the 
states on them, do not encourage responsible fiscal behavior at the state level.  The 
Finance Commission, which recommends to the central government how large a grant 
should be allocated to each state do so based on the predicted gap between a state’s 
revenue and expenditure.104  The resulting motivation is for states to avoid running a 
surplus.  The Planning Commission, which authorizes funding for both center- and state-
originated projects, will help get projects off the ground by paying for the capital and 
operating expenses for the first five years.105  Beginning new projects, regardless of long-
term profitability or sustainability, unnecessarily ties up funding which might be more 
efficiently used if state governments were held fiscally accountable.  The unintended bad 
economic behaviors, highlighted by these and many other examples of centrally managed 
policies, demonstrate the problems caused by inadequate targeting and oversight of the 
government holding the purse strings. 
The combination of state dependencies on central funds with limited authority in 
other fiscal areas has created economic barriers within the country.  States trying to 
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capitalize on the limited revenue authority they do have (taxes on trade within the state 
and taxes on the entry of goods) has inhibited basic economic functions at the 
entrepreneurial level.106   Unlike other regions in which workers’ migration equalizes 
earning differences between sub-national states, cultural and linguistic barriers dissuade 
Indians from doing so.107  As a result, the income levels of poorer states have not closed 
the gap with the national average as quickly as has been observed in other developing 
countries.108 
In summary, there has not been significant fiscal decentralization within India, 
and the political decentralization that has occurred does not correlate with any trends in 
economic growth.  Fiscal liberalization – allowing the market to regulate supply and 
demand – helped India generate the higher-than-average growth numbers of the past 
fifteen years.  The central planning institutions, although trying to maximize state equity, 
is hindering aggregate growth and development by encouraging poor fiscal management 
at state and local levels. 
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IV. DECENTRALIZATION AND POVERTY 
A. POVERTY IN INDIA 
Just as insurgent activity and economic growth have varied across Indian states, 
poverty, and the degree of poverty alleviation has also varied.  However, developing a 
connection between decentralization and poverty is quite a bit more troublesome than 
with insurgency or economic growth for a couple of reasons.  First, the measurement of 
poverty itself is difficult, which in turn makes comparisons across time and regions 
difficult; and second, the anti-poverty policies must travel, in some cases, a very lengthy 
bureaucratic path before eventually ending up at the feet of those it is intended to help.  
Linkages between the degree of decentralization and the degree of poverty reduction may 
be more obscure than the correlations with insurgent violence and economic growth; but 
the fact that there is such a variety of outcomes within India suggests that there are 
conditions under which successful poverty reduction initiatives do take hold.  
Understanding that the decentralization-poverty link may be circuitous at best requires a 
more abstract approach at determining the effect decentralization has on poverty 
alleviation.  This chapter will first define poverty and then identify the relative successes 
and failures in poverty reduction in India, defining them in terms of the relative degree of 
authority state and sub-national governments commanded.  It will be shown that 
effectiveness of anti-poverty measures is ultimately determined by the local 
administrators and that strong central-state-local connections regarding a specific poverty 
alleviation scheme yield the most effective reductions of poverty. 
The methods and means of measuring poverty are still evolving.  A basic 
understanding of “poverty” is embodied by a relatively well known concept of “poverty 
line” – that amount of money which can purchase the bare minimum amount of food to 
sustain a human life.  The World Bank currently uses the amount of $1.08 per day as a 
benchmark of aggregate poverty across the planet.109 There is a huge disparity, though, in 
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the methods of determining who and how many live below the poverty line (earnings 
versus consumption, national or sub-national statistics versus household surveys, and 
calories versus dollars, for instance).  Most studies, therefore, are based on fiscal 
yardsticks since it takes money to buy or grow calories.  Furthermore, most proposals for 
alleviating poverty are expressed in economic terms.  Much of the discussion regarding 
poverty in India therefore occupies the realm of economics. 
There are two types of anti-poverty policies: direct and indirect.110  Direct anti-
poverty policies put cash, assets, or food directly in the hands of the poor.  Examples of 
direct policies include land caps, subsidies, and food rations.  Indirect anti-poverty 
measures focus on creating income opportunities for the poor, such as investing in 
infrastructure, expanding public sector industries, and initiating educational programs.  
Although the direct method has quick, tangible results, the indirect (or growth oriented 
method) is sustainable and, therefore, must be at least a part of any country’s anti-poverty 
policies.111  This is important in India’s case as it has employed both policy types, for 
better and for worse.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine the optimum 
combination of the two methods; the bigger question, however, is whether or not 
decentralization produces policies which are more effective in alleviating poverty. 
Using India as a case study for research on poverty is understandable given the 
relative freedom of researchers in a democratic state and the sheer number of those living 
below the poverty line.  Furthermore, comparing the uneven results in poverty reduction 
across the states is more easily accomplished than comparing uneven results across 
different countries.  In general, the metrics of success or failure are more similar among 
sub-national entities than among national entities, and therefore has the greater potential 
of illuminating what works and what does not. 
Long before the World Bank announced its Millennium Goals, Indian elites 
recognized the magnitude of India’s poverty problem and have on occasion initiated 
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nation-wide poverty-reduction efforts.112  Indira Gandhi’s platform for her reelection in 
1971 was based on eradicating poverty; and though it probably helped mobilizing rural 
and poor urban voters, statistics do not show any significant reductions in poverty rates 
during her time as Prime Minister.113 
India, having almost one third of the world’s population living in poverty, became 
a popular focus of poverty studies as global awareness to poverty issues grew over recent 
decades.  Local and national politicians have joined the call for reform.  Although social 
development prominently appears in economic reform verbiage, actual expenditures 
through the 1990s show paltry increases in social spending.114  Also, the Indian military 
commands a much higher percentage of expenditures than other Asian countries; and the 
complicated tax structure places more burdens on the poor than the wealthy, further 
hindering poverty-reduction measures.115  These criteria explain India’s steady but 
lackluster performance in reducing nation-wide poverty.  What they don’t explain is why 
some states have not seen significant reduction in poverty rates and others have or what 
role decentralization has played in those outcomes. 
The only way to measure the effectiveness of both direct and indirect anti-poverty 
measures is from the local level.  Unlike aggregate insurgency and economic growth data 
for the country shows correlations with periods or regions of decentralization, the 
difficulty in obtaining poverty data means that data sets are usually general and show no 
meaningful correlation over time (Figure 5).  The steady 6.5% growth rate between 1993-
94 and 1999-2000 does overlay a period of increased poverty reduction; but periods of 
sharp growth declines (1979-80, for instance) also preempt an increase, though slight, in 
the rate of poverty reduction.   
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Figure 5.   Poverty Rate Versus Growth Rate.116 
Despite the pervasiveness of poverty on a national level, there have been 
significant differences between states with regards to poverty reduction.  Of note, Bihar, 
Assam, and Orissa, which have traditionally had high levels of poverty, have only seen 
slight reductions in their respective poverty rates, lagging behind the rest of the country 
in poverty reduction results.  On the contrary, Punjab, Kerala, and Goa have seen 
significant reductions in the percentage of their populations living in poverty from 1973 
to 2000 (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6.   Highest and Lowest Poverty Rates (%).117 
Because the most accurate poverty data is that collected at the local level, and the 
country is so expansive, most studies only cover a very limited part of the country.  Those 
that do exist, however, provide a glimpse into the significance decentralization has had in 
reducing poverty.   
B. CASES OF NEGATIVE ANTI-POVERTY RESULTS 
During the framing of the Constitution, the Indian elite wanted to ensure the poor, 
who resided mainly in rural areas, would have a voice with which to make their needs 
known to policy-makers. Theoretically, greater participation will enable more efficient 
targeting of indirect and direct pro-poor policies, and due diligence of local 
administrators is enforced through transparent democratic institutions.  If the application 
of anti-poverty programs is unfair, periodic elections usher in new officials to do the job. 
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The Indian central government, intent on guaranteeing political influence to poor, 
rural voters instituted local panchayats – village-based governments – in the 
Constitution.118  The instruction for states to “to organize village panchayats and endow 
them with such powers and authority as may be necessary” proved to be too vague and 
open to varying interpretations, however, and the system never gained traction or died out 
in many parts of the country.119  In 1992, the central government made another attempt at 
reinvigorating the panchayat system through ratifying the 73rd Amendment to the 
Constitution.  In addition to guaranteeing seats to women and lower castes as well as 
specifying voting periodicity, the amendment granted the local governing bodies the 
authority and responsibility to identify the recipients of government-sponsored anti-poor 
measures.120  This is the most significant attempt by the Government of India to improve 
poverty alleviation through decentralization.  Success, however, varies across states. 
Madhya Pradesh has been hailed as “a pioneer in the field of decentralization.”121  
The state government, showing strong support for the centrally sponsored panchayat 
system, pushed considerable power down to village councils.  These councils, which 
have guaranteed seats for women and scheduled castes, have the authority to plan and 
propose local welfare plans, name beneficiaries of plans, and remove council 
chairpersons when desired.122  Funding authority is somewhat less straightforward, 
however, and highlights an important aspect of decentralization.  District Planning 
Committees (DPCs) which allocate central and state grants to the local levels have 
devolved to placating client networks of the sitting DPC members.123  Therefore, fiscal 
power of local councils, although representing the wishes of its constituents, is subject to 
the political jockeying in the state assembly.  This has clouded the true political beliefs of 
local panchyats as council members are beholden to state-level politicians for future 
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funding.  As a result, poverty reduction efforts in the state have suffered: as of 2000, 37% 
of Madhya Pradesh’s citizens live in poverty, significantly higher than the national 
average.  Disruption of fiscal decentralization yielded incomplete decentralization and 
poverty alleviation suffered. 
Another state which has shown little improvement in poverty reduction efforts is 
Bihar (Figure 6.  ).  Although progress has been made in recent years, the latest poverty 
rate of around 42% is still one of the highest in the country.124  Assessments of the state’s 
poor performance indicate that the results stem from poor decentralization and weak 
infrastructure, impeding the implementation of many center and state welfare schemes.  
A World Bank study shows that 89% of qualified beneficiaries did not receive the 
welfare granted from the center; and of the people who did receive assistance, 49% were 
overqualified for assistance.125  Furthermore, the existing infrastructure simply is unable 
to absorb the large grants from the center.  Between 1997 and 2000 it is estimated that 
Bihar was unable to spend about 20% of the centrally-provided funding.126  The high 
degree of centralization of the state government impedes action in the creation, 
implementation, and targeting of pro-poor policies, which will most likely hinder poverty 
reduction and infrastructure development in the future. 
C. CASES OF POSITIVE ANTI-POVERTY RESULTS 
Cases in which states demonstrate effective reductions in the poverty rate of its 
citizens do show some positive correlations to decentralized governments, although the 
degree of centralization does not seem to be a central factor in their success.  In 
opposition to the cases offered above, lack of corruption, government support of pro-poor 
policies, adequate physical infrastructure, and adequate human resources are the 
dominant similarities of states with histories of strong anti-poverty results. 
Andhra Pradesh offers a clear case of the above assertion.  Although the 
panchayati raj technically exists in Andhra Pradesh, a state-sponsored parallel scheme for 
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local governance has left the village and district councils toothless.127  Funds otherwise 
destined for local councils are granted to janmabhoomi – Andhra Pradesh’s system of 
committees for poverty alleviation – leaving panchayats as largely ceremonial 
institutions.128  Janmabhoomi, through objective-oriented groups such as those focused 
on water management, forest management, welfare services, or road development for 
example, uses existing caste- and class-based structures to mobilize poor workers.  Since 
the focus groups were made up of appointed rather than elected officials, the ruling party 
at the state and district levels end up wielding uncontested authority in the targeting and 
implementation of pro-poor policies.129 
There are proponents of janmabhoomi who claim that, instead of bogging anti-
poverty measures down with democratic institutions, Andhra Pradesh’s system uses 
existing caste-based rural institutions to get initiatives off the ground sooner.130  The 
state, which had a poverty rate of nearly 50% in 1974, effectively reduced that number to 
around 15% in 2000, and the pace of poverty reduction in the past decade has surpassed 
the national average.131  There is evidence, however, that the ruling party, the Telugu 
Desam Party (TDP), have controlled the targeting of welfare programs for electoral 
gain.132  Villages who do not support the TDP at elections risk missing out on pro-poor 
programs.  This loss of political participation masks the true desires of villages which 
means a loss of efficiency in the design and implementation of pro-poor policies.  The 
success of poverty reduction in Andhra Pradesh is more a result of the state government’s 
dedication to poverty eradication (and economic growth – the 4th highest net domestic 
product in the country) than the suitability of particular schemes for particular villages or 
targeting of pro-poor policies.133 
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Sharing a similar poverty rate in 2000 with Andhra Pradesh is Kerala at 13%.134  
Yet a significant difference exists in the rate of poverty reduction of the two states since 
1974.135  The structural differences between the two states that explain this are Kerala’s 
superior human resources and the combined decentralization of fiscal and political 
authority. 
 
Figure 7.   Poverty Rate, Literacy, and HDI Rankings of Select States.136 
Keralans have always stressed literacy, and the state government continued that 
trend since the formal creation of the state in 1957.137  Currently, the left-leaning 
communist government spends 36% more on education and 46% more on health care 
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than the national average.138  This brings up an important point about the significance of 
human resource capability in the presence of decentralization.  The majority of states that 
have poverty rates lower than the country’s national average also exceed the national 
average for literacy.139  And in sync with the ultimate goal of this thesis, overall 
development strongly corresponds to poverty reduction and literacy rates (Figure 7). 
The degree of decentralization in Kerala is significant, too.  The state government 
went above and beyond the center’s re-engagement of the panchayat system by ceding 
considerable fiscal and political authority to district, block, and village councils.  Prior to 
ratification of the 73rd and 74th Amendments, Kerala was one of the states which failed to 
foster local governments as had been intended in the original constitution; and when 
authority was ceded to lower levels, it was usually captured by uncontested local 
elites.140  The campaign to democratize the state did not simply grant political and 
spending authority to lower levels; it laid a foundation of responsible civic society by 
initiating training for over 100,000 citizens from all castes, all classes, and women.141  
The involvement of local societies was also not just left up to voluntary participation.  
Presently, highly structured and publicized local planning meetings are required to 
produce specific development and funding objectives to the State Planning Board.  
Citizens are encouraged to voice problems and prioritize development projects, after 
which the plans are developed and approved by qualified, un-biased citizen focus 
groups.142  Although an empirical study of Kerala highlighted some leakages – inefficient 
use of state funds due to duplication of projects among villages, for example – they are 
very limited and aggregate state development indicators have continued to improve.143  
Additionally, participation in local government institutions is higher than ever, especially 
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among scheduled castes and women.144  In combining the highly literate civil society 
with complete decentralization, Kerala created “a public platform for a vigilant civil 
society, conscious of its rights and committed to the correlative duties, to act as a 
watchdog in the common interest.”145  Because it was complete decentralization – 
including both fiscal and political authority – local councils were not caught in 
clientelistic relationships with higher levels of government, and were therefore free to 
design and implement programs that were most beneficial to the constituents to whom 
they were accountable.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented shows that decentralization only mildly correlates to 
successful poverty alleviation measures; although the cases show that it can enhance 
those measures under certain conditions.  Strong support of governing authorities for pro-
poor policies and the infrastructure to support service delivery of welfare schemes 
indicates with far more reliability the likely success of poverty alleviation programs.  
Corruption-free institutions, properly funded decentralized local governments, under the 
control of a capable, literate civil society may be the most effective combination of 
conditions under which anti-poverty measures succeed.  If nothing else, decentralization 
does increase the efficiency of targeting pro-poor policies.  All else being equal, local 
governments should be able to design policies better suited for their respective regions as 
well as better identify the recipients of welfare programs than a more removed central 
government; and studies of Indian villages confirm this.146  Lastly, decentralization does 
not affect the likelihood of corruption in the cases outlined in this chapter.  Perversions of 
pro-poor policies through diversion of welfare funding and contracts or through electoral 
fraud are evident in both high-poverty and low-poverty states.  Strong institutions of 
higher government might mitigate such instances of corruption by providing a higher 
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authority to which citizens can turn, forcing local governments and officials to be 
accountable up and down.147  This assertion does not promote centralization as an anti-
poverty measure; rather, it encourages the active oversight of legitimate, transparent 
central governments in policy implementation. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. COMMON THEMES OF DECENTRALIZATION 
Understanding that there are many factors that impact human development, this 
thesis attempted to describe the effect decentralization has on three aspects of 
development: insurgent violence, economic growth, and poverty alleviation.  It has been 
shown, through period-to-period and state-to-state comparisons, that decentralization is 
only somewhat related to development, as defined by those three developmental aspects.  
Decentralization alone did not seem to directly contribute to an increase or decrease in 
insurgent violence, economic growth, or poverty alleviation; but rather it appears as a 
development enhancer under the proper conditions.  What follows is a review of India’s 
decentralization patterns and how decentralization, or lack thereof, affected insurgent 
violence, economic growth, and poverty reduction. 
The legacy of India’s power shifts to and from the center originated in the anti-
colonial period.  Massive mobilization efforts required highly coordinated efforts from a 
centralized party.  After Independence, this mentality drove the creation of the 
Constitution that kept the states beholden to the center.  Unlike the federations of 
developed nations like the United States or Japan, where states voluntarily gave up 
autonomy for the advantages of being included under the protective umbrella of a 
centralized government, India was trying to keep its arms around many cultural groups 
which only shared a history of British colonization. 
Cultural and linguistic differences, however, created such pressure on the center 
in the years following 1947 that the center allowed some degree of political 
decentralization and reorganized state boundaries to more accurately represent the 
different cultural groups located within.  This promoted the creation of culture-based 
parties that worked to mobilize their own base of support for leadership positions within 
their own state borders.  As these parties gained political strength, they put increasing 
pressure on the ruling Congress party at the center which, with a few exceptions, 
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carefully relinquished some political authority to the states.  Fiscally, most authority was 
constitutionally tied to the center, and states are still dependent on central grants. 
When Indira Gandhi came to power, she endeavored to recapture much of the 
authority ceded to the states in the preceding years and frequently overstepped 
constitutional boundaries when intervening in states’ affairs.148  The 42nd Amendment 
Act, which legitimized emergency rule of the states by the center, was enacted in 1976.  
Also, the number of times President’s Rule was invoked (a law that allowed the center to 
assume direct control over states) and the duration it was imposed rose sharply in the 
1970s and 1980s.149 
If one were to apply the pendulum theory to India’s decentralization policies, the 
1990s and beyond make sense: there has been a trend to push more fiscal and political 
authority away from the center.  What was highly decentralized in the late 1800s under 
British rule became highly centralized in the early 1900s as the subcontinent massed 
against its rulers.  Independence now achieved, sub-national cultures reasserted their own 
dominance.  Fearing a secessionist splintering of the country, ruling elites pulled back the 
authority to the center.  Finally, out of economic necessity, some authority has been 
ceded back toward the states. 
While there may be one or two more oscillations over the next several decades, it 
seems more like the forces that pushed and pulled on the pendulum are eroding and new 
forces are aligned with different objectives.  Though some present-day calls for more 
state authority have undertones of secession, it is typically due to the legacy of state-
based political parties that traditionally mobilized along linguistic and cultural identities.  
The fact that parties previously associated with one state now span regions of the country, 
and that economic groups from different regions are coalescing to voice their particular 
concerns is evidence that the forces for decentralization are changing.  The composition 
of the Lok Sabha has changed from a house dominated by lawyers to one dominated by 
                                                 
148 Amal Ray and John Kincaid, “Politics, Economic Development, and Second-Generation Strain in 
India’s Federal System,” Publius 18, no. 2 (1988): 158. 
149 Ibid., 151. 
 61
farmers.150  Instead of decentralization for state’s sake, these new groups call for 
decentralization for the sake of efficiency.  And instead of centralizing power to maintain 
the sovereignty of the country, the center is faced with centralizing to ensure less 
developed regions do not get left behind. 
B. DECENTRALIZATION AND INSURGENCY 
The theories on the cause of violence usually point to economic, political, or 
ethnic reasons.  In the comparison of two otherwise identical towns, cities, states, or 
countries, where one experiences violence and one does not, an analyst might be able to 
determine the specific combination of variables responsible for the outbreak.  Such a 
perfect experiment will never exist in the real world.  Furthermore, there will always be, 
as there always have been, exceptions to these types of social theories.  Conditions which 
satisfy the prerequisites for all of the violence theories – a poor, equally distributed multi-
ethnic state with weak government and civil institutions, politicians mobilizing support 
along ethnic lines, and an abundance of loot-able primary commodities, for instance – 
may be overcome by a single, powerful leader. 
The comparative case studies outlined in this thesis, tracing historical patterns of 
peace or violence, do not get the social scientist any closer to the cause of violence; but 
perhaps they move the discussion toward broader views of violence, particularly as it 
pertains to the development of states.  The degree of decentralization amongst our case 
studies does not seem to be a critical instigating element of violence, which can (with few 
exceptions) be explained by traditional insurgency theory.  Generally, peaceful ethnic 
movements existed with a backdrop of an historically substantial civil society or were 
mitigated by a peaceful majority.  The impact of decentralization, then, seems to either be 
a defusing factor before violence has erupted or a dynamic factor of violence 
continuation: the rate and degree of decentralization (or centralization) during periods of 
unrest may perpetuate or escalate violence depending on the strength of sub-national civil 
institutions and the capacity of sub-national governments. 
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Atul Kohli argues that “democracy in a developing country setting both 
encourages ethnic conflict and, under specific circumstances, provides a framework for 
its accommodation.”151  Based on the research of this paper, “specific circumstances” 
include capable state and local government institutions and adequate physical and human 
infrastructure.  Centralizing authority in the presence of those criteria, as in the case of 
Punjab in the 1980s, exacerbated insurgent violence.  Decentralizing without those 
criteria seems to have little effect on existing violence (India’s Northeast).  Lastly, having 
the government capacity and infrastructure under decentralizing policies can mitigate 
violence, as has been shown in Punjab in the 1960s and Tamil Nadu. 
C. DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Although some significant political decentralization measures have been enacted, 
there has been very little fiscal decentralization in India.  Fiscal liberalization – allowing 
the market to regulate supply and demand – helped India generate the higher-than-
average growth numbers which is receiving so much present-day attention.  The central 
planning institutions, still constitutionally rooted in the country’s socialist beginnings, is 
hindering aggregate growth and development by encouraging poor fiscal management at 
state and local levels.  Since Independence, India’s fiscal policies, which stressed 
socialized industrialization, have attempted to maintain that agenda, relenting to 
liberalization only when needed. 
The combination of state dependencies on central funds with limited authority in 
other fiscal areas has created economic barriers within the country.  States trying to 
capitalize on their limited revenue authority (taxes on trade within the state and taxes on 
the entry of goods) has inhibited basic economic functions at the entrepreneurial level.152   
Unlike other regions in which workers’ migration equalizes earning differences between 
sub-national states, cultural and linguistic barriers dissuade Indians from doing so.153  As 
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a result, the income levels of poorer states have not closed the gap with the national 
average as quickly as has been observed in other developing countries.154 
D. DECENTRALIZATION AND POVERTY  
The evidence presented shows that decentralization only mildly correlates to 
successful poverty alleviation measures, although the cases presented here show that it 
can enhance those measures under certain conditions.  Strong support of governing 
authorities for pro-poor policies and the infrastructure to support service delivery of 
welfare schemes indicates with far more reliability the likely success of poverty 
alleviation programs.  Corruption-free institutions, properly funded decentralized local 
governments, under the control of a capable, literate civil society may be the most 
effective combination of conditions under which anti-poverty measures succeed.  All else 
being equal, local governments should be able to design policies better suited for their 
respective regions as well as better identify the recipients of welfare programs than a 
more removed central government as the cases presented in this thesis illustrate.  As is 
the case with the reduction of insurgent violence and promotion of economic growth, 
decentralization alone does not alleviate poverty. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR INDIA 
A common theme among the presented development studies is that the presence 
of an adequate physical and human infrastructure, and a commitment to development 
from all levels of government, is necessary for decentralization policies to be effective.  
This has significant implications for many underdeveloped states in India.  The 
announcement in March 2007 that the central government plans to increase spending on 
education and health care by 34% and 22%, respectively, shows that elites at the center 
are trying to raise the skill level of the civil society.155  They must also show some 
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follow-through, however, to minimize the leakage of designated funds at the state and 
lower levels which plagues many of the country’s states.156 
As far as fiscal decentralization, the center has a more difficult challenge than just 
laying the groundwork for future decentralization.  Six decades of working with a not-
entirely-centralized planning system has institutionalized poor domestic fiscal behaviors 
that need to undergo a potentially painful correction.  Weaning states off central funding, 
which will increase the accountability of state governments, is a tough political hurdle; 
but educating the public and encouraging participation can improve the quality and 
efficiency of service delivery throughout the country.  In a 2004 World Bank report on 
India’s economic reforms, several recommendations were made that highlight the 
importance of decentralization as a means of effective economic growth and are in line 
with the findings of this thesis.  Among the many recommendations regarding 
expenditure restructuring and revenue reform for the central and state governments are 
the following:157 
• Expand privatization of public sectors such as power generation and 
irrigation to mitigate efficiency losses and theft while improving revenue 
collections. 
• Transfer service responsibilities to local governments. 
• Promote consumer awareness and transparency to increase pressure from 
below for timely and appropriate services. 
• Grant states the authority to tax services so that inter-state taxes on trade 
can be abolished. 
In the three areas of development examined in this thesis, a common theme 
underlying positive signs of development in the presence of decentralization is a capable 
sub-national government with sound institutions.  States that had a solid foundation of 
local governance witnessed minimum insurgent violence, positive economic growth, and 
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significant degrees of poverty reduction.  Also, when the central government pulled 
authority away from those states, development suffered as citizens mobilized against the 
center.  If the ruling regime of a developing country wants to improve the development of 
its citizens, it can make some significant strides without decentralization simply by being 
committed to such aspirations.  It may be costly, both in capital and political support, but 
it is certainly possible.  As has been shown here, however, committed upper-level 
governments can greatly improve the rate and completeness of development by 
decentralizing fiscal and political authority to lower-level governments having adequate 
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